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Mr. Morse acknowledges the absence of legal rules of liability dealing
with clinical investigation and suggests that the general laws of consent
which were developed for the traditional patient-physican relationship
are inadequate as presently applied to the legal problems surrounding
clinical investigation. He looks to certain widely accepted codes which
deal with the ethical considerations attendant upon clinical investigation
and concludes that these could provide a basis for new court-made rules
specifically dealing with these problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing concern among the members of the medical
profession with legal rights, obligations and limitations affecting
clinical investigation. This is understandable in light of the virtual
explosion of clinical investigation within medical science.
Clinical investigation is the systematic collection, evaluation and
reporting, by or under the supervision of physicians, of data about
other human beings for the purpose of advancing scientific medical
knowledge. Thus it includes neither investigation relating to animals
(even though such investigation may also advance scientific medical
knowledge), nor investigation of human beings for purposes unrelated
to medical science, nor the trial of unproven procedures in the treat-
ment of patients unless this is also a part of a systematic program
of clinical investigation. Nevertheless, clinical investigation need not
occur within the physician-patient relationship, which arises when a
person seeks and a physican undertakes to furnish medical diagnosis or
treatment. For example, a person who volunteers as a subject of
clinical investigation does not have a physician-patient relationship
with a physician who does not undertake to furnish him any medical
benefit.
Consulting Attorney to the American Medical Association; LL.B., Tulane University.
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II. Ru .s OF LABILIn
The determination of the legal rights, obligations and limitations
involved in clinical investigation is complicated by the fact that special
law in this field is virtually non-existent. With few exceptions, the
sources of legal rules-constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions and
administrative decisions, rules and regulations-provide no special
standards for clinical investigation. This does not mean, however, that
clinical investigation is above the law. There are general rules of law
that do apply, and they certainly will be applied by the courts if
litigation arises. The most significant of these general rules are those
relating to compensation for personal injury. Although it cannot be
known with exactness how the courts will adapt these general rules
of liability to the unexplored field of clinical investigation, the probable
application of the rules can be foreseen with sufficient reliability to
provide a practical guide for physicians engaging in clinical investiga-
tion.
A. The Requirement of Consent
Perhaps the most important general rule of law to be considered
is that relating to assault, that is, the rule that anyone who intention-
ally takes any action which affects the body or mind of another
without the legally valid consent of that person is liable for damages,
unless there is a specific legal justification for that action.' To be an
effective defense against such liability, consent must be both voluntary
and informed.2
1. Informed Consent.-Consent is not "informed" if the physician
withholds information as to either the risk involved in the treatment
(or, if treatment is not had, the nature of the treatment) or the
results that reasonably may be expected, that is, the possibilities of
successful treatment 3 These rules of law should apply to clinical
investigation situations, where the therapy involved usually follows
medically accepted, rather than unproven, procedures.
As long as he is motivated by concern for his patient, the physician
may freely use his position of confidence and trust and his powers
of persuasion in urging his patient to agree to medically indicated
1. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N.W. 12 (1905); Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
2. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, aff'd on rehearing, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).




treatment.4 In exceptional circumstances recognized by standard
medical practice, he may even withhold information from the patient
which would otherwise be necessary in order to obtain an informed
consent.5 Obviously, in medical matters the physician and his patient
are not equals. In the ordinary case, the patient is entitled to be
informed about his condition, the nature of the treatment proposed
and any unusual risks, and the results that may be anticipated.6 But
in the final analysis he will usually rely upon the advice and judgment
of his physician. If the information supplied is sufficient to serve as
the basis for the patient's informed consent, the physician may freely
urge the patient to submit to recommended treatment. What may
be "acceptable persuasion" as applied to medical treatment may be
"undue influence," however, when applied to clinical investigation
outside of the physician-patient relationship.
Generally, physicians may be said to have a duty to inform. They
must explain a proposed procedure or therapy in lay terms so that
the patient has the opportunity to ask questions and come to a rea-
sonable understanding of the decision he is to make.7 In the normal
course of treatment, the physician is expected (1) to explain his
diagnosis and prognosis,8 (2) to describe in non-technical terms the
procedure or therapy he proposes and explain any unusual hazard or
risk of complications that may be inherent in such procedure or
therapy,9 and (3) to explain the results that may be reasonably
anticipated, particularly if the prospect for improving the patient's
condition is limited.10 This does not mean, however, that the physician
must discuss with his patient remote possibilities of disaster if satis-
factory results are normally achieved uneventfully."
Medicine is both a science and an art, requiring the exercise of
technical skills within the framework of the personal relationship
between the physician and his patient. In the practice of his art, the
physician can inspire the confidence and tranquility of his patient
4. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
5. Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Grosjean v. Spencer, 140
N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1966); Aiken v. Clary, 136 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Watson v.
Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964); Fischer v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 51
Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (1959); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App. 318,
381 S.W.2d 563 (1964).
6. Natanson v. Kline, supra note 2.
7. Block v. McVay, 80 S.D. 469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964); Mohr v. Williams, supra
note 1.
8. Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918); Rogers v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 119 So. 2d 649 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
9. Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wash. 2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945).
10. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960); Bolam v. Friern Hosp.,
[1957] AIlE.R. 118 (Q.B.).
11. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
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even under discouraging circumstances. Compliance with the legal
requirements for informed consent need not keep the physician from
being compassionate in his patient relationships. His tone and manner
may freely express encouragement or a note of optimism for which a
basis exists in the patient's circumstances.
The need for an informed consent does not require a departure
from common-sense standards of medical practice. Actually, the
physician's obligation has been judicially interpreted as a duty to
follow the standard of medical practice prevailing among reputable
physicians in the community as to the extent and kind of information
given to patients under similar circumstances.' 2 It is customary for
the conscientious physician not only to inform but also to employ an
element of persuasion if this is in the best interest of the patient, such
as where the advantages of treatment clearly outweigh its risks. But
where there is a close or unknown balance between the possible
benefits and hazards of an inherently risky procedure, the physician's
influence should be so tempered as to give the patient greater responsi-
bility in making his own decision.
Following standard medical practice means also that in exceptional
circumstances the patient need not be given the details about his
condition or proposed treatment.13 For example, it may be medically
desirable and customary to withhold distressing information from a
critically ill cancer patient, or to avoid a frank explanation of pro-
posed treatment where the patient is so emotionally upset or disturbed
that such an explanation would cause him to refuse clearly advisable
treatment. Under these circumstances, the physician should discuss
the situation fully with a member of the patient's immediate family or,
if there is none, with a friend who is concerned about the patient's
well-being and informed regarding his personal affairs. 14 This excep-
tion cannot be supported, however, simply on the possibility that
information necessary to permit an informed consent might cause the
patient to reject recommended treatment on an entirely rational basis. 15
If this justification were acceptable, it would practically dispense with
the need for informed consent and deprive the patient of the right
which the courts are seeking to protect, that is, the freedom to choose
or decline treatment for whatever reason the patient may have.
The duty to disclose is limited to those disclosures which a rea-
12. Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Luka v. Lowric,
171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Ollet v. Pittsburgh, Cin., Chi. & St. L. Ry., 201
Pa. 361, 50 Ad. 1011 (1902); Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
13. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
14. Natanson v. Kline, supra note 2.
15. Natanson v. Kline, supra note 2.
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sonable clinical investigator would make under the same or similar
circumstances. How he may best discharge his obligation to the
subject in this difficult situation involves primarily a question of
medical judgment. His choice of one of several plausible courses
should not be called into question if it appears, all circumstances
considered, that he was motivated only by the best interests of both
the subject and medical science, and that he proceeded as competent
investigtaors would have done in a similar situation.
The fundamental distinction between negligence and assault and
battery is that the former is unintentional and the latter intentional.
Thus where a subject consents to undergo clinical investigation, but
the nature, consequences and risks of the investigation are not
properly explained to him, he may have a cause of action for assault.
And where a subject does give informed consent to undergo investiga-
tion, but is injured as a result of lack of due care by the investigator,
he has a cause of action for negligence.
The clinical investigator is under a general duty to inform the
subject of the possible collateral hazards. He violates that duty and
subjects himself to liability if he withholds from the subject any facts
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent to the
proposed investigation. Likewise, the investigator may not minimize
the known dangers of an investigation in order to induce the subject's
consent.16 The greater and more numerous the risks, the greater the
understanding thereof that the courts will require.'7
"Caveat emptor" (let the buyer beware) has no place in the law
of the business of medicine. Although in one sense the patient may
be regarded as a buyer of medical services, the courts place a great
deal of responsibility upon the physician because of the position of
confidence and trust which he occupies in relation to patients.'8 He is
expected to explain his treatment, anticipated results, and unusual
risks and at the same time to dedicate himself to his patient's benefit.
This becomes a legal tightrope when a frank explanation of hazards
may serve so to upset an emotional patient that he will choose the
greater risk of declining treatment. The courts, recognizing the
physician's dilemma in such situations, have stated that he should
conduct himself according to the standard prevailing among other
reputable practitioners. 9 If the circumstances in particular cases
16. Mitchell v. Robinson, supra note 10.
17. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
Mmmr. L. REv. 381, 427 (1957).
18. Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964); Woods v. Brumlop,
71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Valentine v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 194 Cal.
App. 2d 282, 15 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1961).
19. Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Ditlow v. Kaplan,
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justify a lesser explanation of hazards in the interest of the patient,
then it would follow that experimentation with a human subject would
require a more thorough and objective explanation of risks than is
normally required in medical treatment.
The question of how much information a physician must furnish
to a patient in order to avoid legal liability is somewhat confused
because it arises out of two separate and distinct legal obligations.
One is the necessity to obtain valid consent. The other requires the
physician to act with the highest degree of good faith to protect the
best interests of the patient. Both obligations apply to clinical inves-
tigation within the physician-patient relationship; but the second
obligation does not apply to clinical investigation outside of that rela-
tionship.
Thus it appears that the clinical investigator must always give the
minimum amount of information necessary to obtain valid consent.
The exception which permits the withholding of information for the
benefit of the patient does not apply in the clinical investigation
situation. On the other hand, where sufficient information has been
given in order to obtain valid consent, it would not appear that
liability would arise from a failure to give additional information to
an investigative subject who is not a patient.
Consent by the patient must also be "voluntary." For instance,
consent is obviously lacking if a surgeon through error operates on
the wrong person, or amputates the wrong limb, or performs elective
surgery upon a patient who is informed only that he is to be examined
for purposes of diagnosis. 0 Voluntary consent presupposes that the
individual was supplied with sufficient information to enable him to
make a knowledgeable choice. Consent given in ignorance is not in
any realistic sense voluntary. Moreover, consent cannot be deemed
voluntary simply because it was not obtained under force or duress.21
2. Voluntary Consent.-Although laymen are not ordinarily capable
of the same understanding about proposed medical treatment or ex-
perimentation as are physicians, they are not completely ignorant
about medical procedures and treatment. Considerable public interest
and knowledge about medicine is gained from newspapers, magazines
and ordinary education. There is more common knowledge about
medicine, its successes, and its failures than ever before. The courts
181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d
74 (1965).
20. Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964); Covin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d
421 (Wyo. 1962); Fischer v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., supra note 5.
21. Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
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have recognized that laymen are capable of understanding in general
terms such matters as the results that may be reasonably expected
from treatment and the degree of risk to life or health that may be
involved.2 On the other hand, the courts have laid down the rule that
an individual cannot be deemed voluntarily to have consented to treat-
ment about which he knows little or nothing.2 3 "Voluntary" consent
is thus closely related to "informed" consent. But there is voluntary
consent when there is freedom to choose with understanding; that is,
voluntary consent arises out of an unrestricted freedom to choose and
.a reasonable understanding of the choices available.24
3. Constructive Consent.-In emergencies, where the patient is un-
conscious or irrational and there is no other person available who is
legally authorized to approve treatment, "constructive" consent may
be implied from the circumstances.2 The physician's authority to
proceed with treatment is based upon the presumption that the
patient would have consented to treatment necessary to protect his
life or health if he had been able to do S0.26 This is an exception to
the physician's legal duty to obtain consent prior to treatment.
4. Capacity to Consent.-The validity of consent also depends upon
the legal capacity or authority of the person who gives the consent.
It is generally recognized that infants or persons suffering from general
mental incompetence are not legally capable of giving consent on any
subject.27 Competence to give consent is not necessarily an all-or-
nothing situation, however. Some persons may be legally capable
of giving consent for some purposes, but not for all.2 To whatever
extent a person is incapable of giving consent, the law grants to some
other person the authority to act for him, at least for limited purposes.29
If the subject has been committed to a mental institution or certified
as laboring under a legally recognized aberration and is therefore (to
use the Illinois designation for the purpose of illustration) a legally
insane person, a sexually dangerous person (a criminal sexual psycho-
pathic person), a criminally mentally incompetent person, a person in
need of mental treatment, or a mentally retarded person, then, of
22. Mitchell v. Robinson, supra note 10.
23. Patrick v. Sedwick, supra note 20; Hunt v. Bradshaw, supra note 4.
24. Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, supra note 3.
25. REGAN, DocToR AND PATIENT AND =s LAw 41 (3d ed. 1956).
26. Monrz & STmTER, LEGAL MEDICINE 151 (2d ed. 1964).
27. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935).
28. Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
29. Crippen v. Pulliam, 61 Wash. 2d 725, 380 P.2d 475 (1963).
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course, consent could not be obtained from the subject.30 In such a
situation consent should be obtained from both parties in loco
parentis-the individual and the institution. If the subject is married,
the individual would be the spouse.31 If the subject is unmarried, the
individual would be the closest next of kin.32 For the ascertainment of
the closest of kin, a good "rule of thumb" to follow is the order of
priorities contained in the particular state's law of descent and
distribution.
The consent of the individual is of a higher nature and, conse-
quently, of more importance than the consent of the institution. This
is so because, from a legal point of view, the subject-individual rela-
tionship is analogous to the concept of possession, whereas the subject-
institution relationship is analogous to the lesser concept of custody.33
Again analogously, and again from a legalistic standpoint, the seat of
the subject-individual relationship is akin to the concept of domicile,
whereas the seat of the subject-institution relationship is akin to the
concept of residence. It is conceivable, therefore, that the ostensibly
informed consent of the individual would be subjected to an even
greater degree of legal scrutiny than the purported informed consent
of the institution.
If the subject has not been committed or certified to be laboring
under a legally recognized mental disability, his consent, of course,
must be obtained first. If the subject is a prisoner, three consents
should be obtained-from the prisoner, his spouse (othervise, his
nearest of kin), and the institution.
The courts have made it clear that a child is not the property of
its parents and may not be dealt with without regard for his best
interests.3 In a number of cases, for exanple, the courts have inter-
vened to order medically indicated blood transfusions over the objec-
tions of the child's parents.35
If a parent or guardian agrees to a minor's participation in clinical
investigation, outside of the physician-patient relationship, that is not
hazardous in terms of life, health, pain, or suffering, and if injury does
not occur, the likelihood of legal problems is remote. Here, the issue
of legal consent is, more or less, academic. Where the possibility of
danger to the minor's life or health is not remote, the legal issue of
consent cannot be brushed aside so easily.
30. Farber v. Olkon, 246 P.2d 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952), aff'd, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254
P.2d 520 (1953).
31. Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957).
32. Farber v. Olkon, supra note 30.
33. Crippen v. Pulliam, supra note 29.
34. Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 50 So. 2d 364 (1951); in re Rotkowitz,
175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941).
35. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
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A parent or guardian has an obligation to act in the child's best
interests and for his benefit.36 Accordingly, consent can be given on
behalf of the child for medically indicated treatment.37 The parental
responsibility may be violated, though, if a parent or guardian exposes
the child to unnecessary danger.38 Consequently, the parent's consent
to the use of a child for clinical investigation that is not medically
indicated for the benefit of the child may be of doubtful validity as
a defense against a liability claim. Illness or injury may justify
appropriate but unproven therapy if other procedures are unsatisfac-
tory. But clinical investigation which is not for the purpose of treating
the child cannot be assumed to be for the child's benefit simply
because the child might later have the "satisfaction" or "reward" of
participation in medical progress.
Although a number of courts have said that a minor who has
reached the age of sufficient understanding (the so-called age of
discretion) can consent to medically indicated treatment,3 9 it is ques-
tionable whether the courts would take the same position with respect
to his participation in clinical investigation. It is likely that a court
would regard submission to clinical treatment as a reasonable area
for the decision of a mature minor, and that doubt concerning capacity
to consent would be resolved in favor of the child acting for his own
benefit.
The courts generally allow minors to make their own decisions in
business and property matters only when such freedom is consistent
with their own well-being and public policy.40 Inasmuch as the courts
give greater protection to life and health than to property rights,
41
they may ordinarily be expected to regard voluntary participation in
clinical investigation involving hazard as a privilege reserved only
for adults. One medical authority in England has said:
it is clearly within the competence of a parent or guardian of a child to give
permission for procedures intended to benefit that child when he is not old
or intelligent enough to be able himself to give a valid consent. In the
strict view of the law parents and guardians of minors cannot give consent
on their behalf to any procedures which are of no particular benefit to
them and which may carry some risk of harm. The reality of any purported
36. RuBENsThIN, CoNTEi'ORAnY REuGious JUIuSPRUDENCE 43-44 (1948).
37. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
38. Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Owens v. State,
6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911).
39. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928); Lacey v.
Laird, supra note 28; Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
40. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 168 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1948).
41. Application of Sacer Realty Corp., 73 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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consent which may have been obtained is a question of fact, and as with
an adult the evidence would, if necessary, have to show that irrespective of
age the person concerned fully understood the implications to himself of
the procedures to which he was consenting. In the case of children and
young persons the question whether purported consent was true consent
would in each case depend upon facts such as the age, intelligence, situation,
and character of the subject, and the nature of the investigation.
42
The general rule concerning consent with respect to a surgical
operation on a child was stated in 1941 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bonner v. Moran.43 It probably
has equal application to consent in respect to a child's participation
in clinical investigation. The rule was stated as follows:
In deference to common experience, there is general recognition of the fact
that many persons by reason of their youth are incapable of intelligent
decision, as the result of which public policy demands legal protection of
their personal as well as their property rights. . . . Hence it is not at all
surprising that, generally speaking, the rule has been considered to be
that a surgeon has no legal right to operate upon a child without the consent
of his parents or guardian. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule.
One of them is in cases of emergency, when obviously an operation is
necessary ... others perhaps in cases in which the child has been emanci-
pated, or where the parents are so remote as to make impracticable the
obtaining of their consent in time to accomplish proper results. And where
the child is close to maturity, it has been held that the surgeon may be
justified in accepting his consent. . . . But in all such cases the basic con-
sideration is whether the proposed operation is for the benefit of the child
and is done with a purpose of saving his life or limb.44
Outside of the physician-patient relationship, it is clear that persons
lacking capacity to consent should not be used for clinical investiga-
tion merely because they are convenient or available. It is recognized,
however, that in some instances the advancement of medical science
would be impossible without the use of persons of this class as investi-
gative subjects. Some kinds of clinical investigation of children's
diseases cannot be accomplished without using children as subjects.
Similarly, necessary research on mental retardation might be impos-
sible without the participation of mentally retarded subjects. It seems
unlikely that public policy would entirely foreclose clinical investiga-
tion in these fields outside of the physician-patient relationship. There
would, of course, never be any justification for the use of subjects
who lack capacity to consent if the data sought could be obtained
42. Responsibility in Investigations on Human Subjects-Statement by Medical Re-
search Council, Brit. Med. J., July 18, 1964, pp. 178-79.
43. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
44. Id. at 122-23.
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by using mentally competent adult subjects. It is also doubtful that
it would ever be justifiable to subject children to the same degree
of risks as would be permissible in the case of mentally competent
adult subjects or of patients for whom possible benefits might offset
the risk.
It is likely that some mechanism will eventually be developed to
provide authorization for the participation of subjects who lack the
capacity to consent in clinical investigation outside of the physician-
patient relationship, under appropriate limitations and with adequate
safeguards. At present, however, there is no recognized procedure for
establishing a defense against liability for unauthorized investigation of
this type. The clinical investigator can minimize the legal risk, of
course, by limiting the use of such subjects to situations in which there
is the strongest scientific justification and the minimum of risk of
injury.
B. The Duty To Exercise Reasonable Care
Another important principle of law is the general rule that a person
is liable for damages when his negligence has caused injury to the
person or property of another.45 Negligence is the failure to conform
to the standard of reasonable care.46 In the physician-patient relation-
ship the physician is expected to possess and exercise that degree of
skill and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by physicians in good
standing in similar circumstances.47 This standard applies where
clinical investigation is conducted within the physician-patient re-
lationship. Where it is conducted outside of that relationship, it is
likely that the applicable standard would be that of the reasonable
and prudent clinical investigator; in other words, the investigator
would be required to possess and exercise that degree of skill and
care that is ordinarily possessed and exercised by clinical investigators
under similar circumstances. In neither case would liability arise
unless a failure to conform to the respective standards was the
proximate cause of injury to the patient or the subject.4
In clinical investigation, negligence may consist of errors in proce-
dure or technique, as it would in other forms of activity. It may also
consist, however, of exposure of the patient or subject to unnecessary
45. Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146 (1925); Patten v. Bart-
lett, 111 Me. 49, 89 Ad. 375 (1914); Turlington v. Tampa Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 398,
56 So. 696 (1911); Loso v. Lancaster County, 77 Neb. 466, 109 N.W. 752 (1906);
West Virginia Cent. & Pitt. fy. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 54 Adt. 669 (Ct. App. 1903).
46. 1 SHEAmiAN & REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 7 (1941).
47. CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DISSECTED FOn QuncK GRASPING 35 (1962).
48. 13 SHEA1jAN & REDFIELD, op. cit. .supra note 46, at 1527-28.
1967 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
or unwarranted risks or of failure to provide adequate safeguards by
departing from the respective standards of care.
There are many judicial decisions on the issue of professional negli-
gence in the physician-patient relationship4 9 These would apply gen-
erally, of course, to clinical investigation within that relationship.
None of them, however, relates specifically to clinical investigation
as defined herein, either within or without the physician-patient
relationship.
Usually, medical investigation involves departures from generally
accepted procedures for diagnosis or therapy. Not every instance
of departure from such generally accepted procedures constitutes
clinical investigation, however. To achieve that status, the departure
must be a part of a systematic program for the advancement of
scientific medical knowledge. The cultist practitioner who has a
mistaken and scientifically unsupported belief in the efficacy of a
special procedure is not engaged in clinical investigation when he
applies that procedure to a patient. The conscientious physician who
tries an unproved but promising therapy solely for the benefit of his
patient, without engaging in any systematic collection of data is like-
wise not engaged in clinical investigation. A few cases involving these
types of departures from accepted forms of therapy have reached the
courts.50 Some of the opinions contain references to clinical investiga-
tion and appear to convey the impression that such investigation can
be carried on only at the risk of the investigator. The context of these
decisions makes it doubtful, however, that this impression was in-
tended. In any event, it is highly unlikely that courts would take
such an extreme position today.
The significance of the case law in this area should nevertheless be
49. Lawrence v. Nutter, 203 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1953) (failure of physician to
administer gas gangrene antitoxin); Goodwin v. Hertzberg, 201 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.
1952) (perforation of woman's urethra in performance of operation); Stickleman v.
Synhorst, 243 Iowa 872, 52 N.W.2d 504 (1952) (negligence in injecting oil into
patient's trachea in lung mapping process causing excessive loss of blood); Huffman v.
Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951) (nonsurgical treatment of brain
injury); Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951) (negligence of
physician leaving part of surgical sponge in wound); Madis v. Steliwagen, 38 Wash.
2d 1, 227 P.2d 445 (1951) (failure to remove needle in eye operation); Moore v.
Belt, 34 Cal. 2d 525, 212 P.2d 509 (1950) (cause of infection of urinary passages
resulting from genito-urinary examination); Merkle v. Kegerreis, 350 Ill. App. 103,
112 N.E.2d 175 (1953) (negligence of roentgenologist in removing plantar wart from
ball of foot); Bradshaw v. Wilson, 87 Ohio App. 319, 94 N.E.2d 706 (1950) (failure
of orthopedic surgeon to properly reduce fracture of arm); Nielsen v. Milligan, 100
Cal. App. 2d 40, 222 P.2d 916 (1950) (failure to check infection when it first de-
veloped).




examined and evaluated. In Carpenter v. Blake in 1871, the Supreme
Court of New York declared:
[I]t is incumbent on surgeons called to treat such an injury, to conform
to the system of treatment thus established; and if they depart from it,
they do it at their peril. [Blefore the new practice can be used, to shield
the surgeon from the charge of malpractice, it must appear that the cases
in which it was tested were substantially the same as those treated... [by
other authorities] and that the treatment thus resorted to has been successful
in so many instances as to establish satisfactorily the propriety and safety of
adopting it.51
The first sentence indicates a strong disposition on the part of the
jurists to carry over the stultifying effect of a strict adherence to stare
decisis to their medical brethren. The second sentence represents a
classic example of circular reasoning by the judiciary. How can a new
practice have been successful in prior instances unless it is used
initially? How can a surgeon acquire experience in administering a
new treatment without inaugurating such treatment? The second
sentence overlooks the obvious fact that some human being somewhere
must necessarily be the first one upon whom a medical technique is
tried or to whom a new medicine is administered. A literal compliance
with the second sentence would stifle to the point of stymieing medical
innovation and consequent advancement. Clearly, in Carpenter the
trial of an unproven procedure was confused with a failure to adhere
to the community standard.
In Langford v. Kosterlitz52 in 1930, the District Court of Appeal of
California ruled that subjecting a patient to unproven therapy without
disclosure and consent is contrary to the custom of physicians, and
thus constitutes negligence even though there was no technical error
in the actual performance of the procedure. It is apparent that by
1930 there was an absolute judicial insistence on informed consent as
a condition precedent to unproven procedures.
In Fortner v. Koch in 1935, the Supreme Court of Michigan de-
clared: "[I]f the general practice of medicine and surgery is to
progress, there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried
on; but such experiments must be done with the knowledge and
consent of the patient or those responsible for him, and must not vary
too radically from the accepted method of procedure."53 Fortner is
of special significance, for here the court was not merely condoning
but was actually encouraging the trial of unproven procedures. The
51. 60 Barb. 488, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696
(1872).
52. 107 Cal. App. 175, 290 Pac. 80 (1930).
53. 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935).
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first phrase of the quoted sentence should be considered and treated
as a judicial policy statement. The last phrase of the quoted sentence
contains three important points. The first of these repeats the insis-
tence of Langford on informed consent as a prerequisite to such proce-
dures. The second point raises the very significant and difficult
problem, to be discussed and analyzed in this paper, of whether one
in loco parentis to a subject may give effective consent for the adminis-
tration of an unproven procedure and, if so, under what legal disability
must the subject be laboring and what must the loco parentis rela-
tionship be. The third point projects the element of extent into the
picture, that is, how far may the unproven procedure vary from the
traditional methods-what, in short, is the degree of tolerance?
Similar misapprehension is sometimes created by extrajudicial state-
ments on medical experiments. An example is the following statement
by Claude Bernard:
As far as direct applicability to medical practice is concerned, it is quite
certain that experiments made on man are always the most conclusive. No
one has ever denied it. First, have we a right to perform experiments and
vivisections on man? Physicians make therapeutic experiments daily on their
patients, and surgeons perform vivisections daily on their subjects. Experi-
ments, then, may be performed on man, but within what limits? It is our
duty and our right to perform an experiment on man whenever it can save
his life, cure him, or gain him some personal benefit. The principle of
medical and surgical morality, therefore, consists in never performing on
man an experiment which might be harmful to him to any extent, even
though the result might be highly advantageous to science, i.e., to the
health of others. But performing experiments and operations exclusively
from the point of view of the patient's own advantage does not prevent their
turning out profitably to science.54
In actual litigation, the standard for protection from liability will
undoubtedly be what the court or the jury believes to be the prevailing
standard of reasonable care. A prevailing practice of following an in-
adequate standard of care will not necessarily afford a defense, for
liability is always tested by whether or not there was a failure to
exercise reasonable care.
Research institutions have established high standards for clinical
investigation, both within and without the physician-patient relation-
ship. Other means of investigation are always exhausted before investi-
gation with human beings is attempted. Subjects and patients are
kept under close and frequent observation, and the investigation is
terminated whenever adverse effects are detected. Research is con-
54. Claude Bernard, cited by Bean, Testament of Duty: Some Strictures on Moral




ducted by teams of physicians and scientists who represent a wide
spectrum of skills and who are trained in clinical investigation. ,Unless
the physician in private practice can match the skill, care, and safe-
guards provided in research institutions, he may be in a precarious
position of legal liability if he attempts a radical form of unproven
therapy. The skilled practicing physician is not necessarily a capable
clinical investigator at all levels of investigation. No physician should
undertake investigation beyond his level of competence.
III. STAiND ADS DimuvD FROM CoLrAERA SouRcEs
Specific legal authority concerning the details of what clinical
investigators should or should not do to avoid liability is not available.
Certain collateral sources which may offer some guidance in judging
what is proper conduct are available, however.
A. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
One possible source is section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmestic Act.55 It prohibits the introduction of any new drug into
interstate commerce unless it is first accepted as safe and effective by
the Food and Drug Administration. This section provides, however,
that regulations must be promulgated exempting from this prohibition
"drugs intended solely for investigational use by experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to investigate the safety and effec-
tiveness of drugs," and such regulations must "provide that such
exemption shall be conditioned upon the manufacturer, or the sponsor
of the investigation, requiring that experts using such drugs for investi-
gational purposes certify to such manufacturer or sponsor that they will
inform any human beings to whom such drug, or any controls used in
connection therewith, are being administered, or their representatives,
that such drugs are being used for investigational purposes and will
obtain the consent of such human beings or their representatives,
except where they deem it not feasible or, in their professional judg-
ment, contrary to the best interest of such human beings."
The Food and Drug Administration has issued a Statement of
Policy, interpreting these provisions of the statute, as follows:
(a) Section 505 (i) of the act provides that regulations on use of investi-
gational new drugs on human beings shall impose the condition that investi-
gators 'obtain the consent of such human beings or their representatives,
except where they deem it not feasible or, in their professional judgment




contrary to the best interest of such human beings.' (b) This means that
the consent of such human beings (or the consent of their representatives)
to whom investigational drugs are administered primarily for the accumula-
tion of scientific knowledge, for such purposes as studying drug behavior,
body processes, or the course of a disease, must be obtained in all cases
and, in all but exceptional cases, the consent of patients under treatment
of investigational drugs must be obtained. (c) 'Under treatment' applies
when the administration of the investigational drug for either diagnostic or
therapeutic purposes constitutes responsible medical judgment, taking into
account the availability of other remedies or drugs and the individual
circumstances pertaining to the person to whom the investigational drug
is to be administered. (d) 'Exceptional cases,' as used in paragraph (b) of
this section, which exceptions are to be strictly applied, are cases where
it is not feasible to obtain the patient's consent or the consent of his repre-
sentative, or where, as a matter of professional judgment exercised in the
best interest of a particular patient under the investigator's care, it would
be contrary to that patient's welfare to obain his consent. (e) 'Patient'
means a person under treatment. (f) 'Not feasible' is limited to cases
where the investigator is not capable of obtaining consent because of
inability to communicate with the patient or his representative; for example,
where the patient is in a coma or is otherwise incapable of giving informed
consent, his representative cannot be reached, and it is imperative to
administer the drug without delay. (g) 'Contrary to the best interests of
such human beings' applies when the communication of information to
obtain consent would seriously affect the patient's disease status and the
physician has exercised a professional judgment that under the particular
circumstances of this patient's case, the patient's best interests would
suffer if consent were sought. (h) 'Consent' or 'informed consent' means
that the person involved has legal capacity to give consent, is so situated
as to be able to exercise free power of choice, and is provided with a fair
explanation of all material information concerning the administration of the
investigational drug, or his possible use as a control, as to enable him to
make an understanding decision as to his willingness to receive said investiga-
tional drug. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an
affirmative decision by such person the investigator should make known to
him the nature, duration, and purpose of the administration of said investi-
gational drug; the method and means by which it is to be administered; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected, including the fact,
where applicable, that the person may be used as a control; the existence of
alternative forms of therapy, if any; and the effects upon his health or person
that may possibly come from the administration of the investigational drug.
Said patient's consent shall be obtained in writing by the investigator.5 6
It should be noted that the statute and policy statement technically
relate only to the introduction into interstate commerce of a new drug
intended solely for investigational use. In form, at least, it is a legal
limitation on manufacturers or others who would introduce a drug into
interstate commerce, not a limitation on clinical investigators. It has
56. 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (1967).
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no application to clinical investigation of drugs not introduced into
interstate commerce or to clinical investigation not related to drugs. It
does not directly impose any duty on clinical investigators, although it
has the effect of barring clinical investigation involving a new drug for
introduction into interstate commerce where the investigators have not
given the required information or obtained the required consent.
It is obvious, however, that the primary if not the only reason why
Congress included these provisions in the statute was to protect those
human beings who participate in clinical investigation of drugs either
within or without the physician-patient relationship. For that reason,
the statutory provisions and the policy statement tend to establish
minimum standards for clinical investigators. These standards would
not necessarily apply in litigation concerning legal liability, but they
do furnish some guide to the standards that might be applied.
Other statutory provisions which have a bearing on clinical investi-
gation are found in state statutes which permit prisoners to volunteer
for medical research. In Iowa, the prisoner must volunteer in writing
and may withdraw his consent, at any time.57 in Virginia, prisoners
are permitted to participate in medical research under regulations
prescribed by the State Board of Prisons.58
B. Insistence on Written Informed Consent by
Hospital Administrators
Collateral guidance may also be obtained from some court decisions
not related to liability. One arose out of a cancer research program in
a private hospital in New York.59 A substance derived from cancer
cells was injected into chronically ill patients, who were told that they
would receive a harmless substance which might cause a slight dis-
comfort. Only oral consent had been obtained. Litigation arose out
of the efforts of one member of the hospitalrs board of directors to
get information from the hospital records concerning this program.
In this 1964 case, Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York stated:
The Hospital's future policy will be in accordance with petitioner's con-
tention that experiments such as the one here involved should be done
only with the patient's written consent after the patient has been properly
informed. On September 7, 1963, the Hospitars Grievance Committee ap-
proved the experiment. On September 30, 1963, its board of directors
approved its Grievance Committee's report. On January 27, 1964, the
57. IOWA CODE ANN. § 246.47 (1949).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-57.1 (1950).
59. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818 (2d Dept. 1964), reo'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397, 206 N.E.2d 338 (1965).
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Hospital's Research Committee approved continuance of the cancer im-
munization studies, but only upon the written, informed consents of the
patients.60
Here we have judicial insistence not only on informed consent but
on "written, informed" consent, the court stating "that experiments
should be done only with the patient's written consent after the
patient has been properly informed."61 Hyman was reversed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals of New York,62 but on a ground unrelated to
the propriety of clinical investigation. Stemming from this litigation,
as the Court of Appeals pointed out, the board of directors "merely
enacted rules of the hospital [which] now require that written and
informed consents of the patients be obtained before experiment."63
C. Ethical Standards Developed by the Medical Profession
Also of some assistance in delineating reasonable standards for
clinical investigation are certain ethical standards which have been
developed by the medical profession.
1. Nuremberg Code.-The most important of these perhaps is the
so-called "Nuremberg Code."64 Early in 1946 the Allied Military
Tribunal was preparing for the trials of twenty-three Nazi physicians
and scientists charged with diabolical experiments on political
prisoners. At the requests of the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of War, the American Medical Association appointed Dr. Andrew C.
Ivy to serve as an advisor to the prosecuting attorneys on the ethics of
medical research. Dr. Ivy, with the assistance of other physicians,
drafted an outline of ten principles of ethics governing the use of
human subjects in medical research. These principles, with slight
amendment, were presented during the trials by General Telford
Taylor as the cornerstone of the allied case against the Nazi physicians.
The opinions of the Military Tribunal adopted these principles as a
ten-point judicial summary of the expert medical testimony presented
principally by the prosecution.
The ten points of the Nuremberg Code are as follows:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good
60. Id. at 499, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
61. Ibid.
62. 15 N.Y.2d 317, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397, 206 N.E.2d 338 (1965).
63. Id. at 319, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 399, 206 N.E.2d at 339.
64. United States v. Brandt, in 2 Tr,&s OF WAR CImuNALS BEFoRE NuiumumnRc
MIrrARY ThBu Ns (October 1946-April 1949) 181-84 (1950).
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of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not
random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease
or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify
the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to
believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in
those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the
experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to
protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of
injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required
through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in
the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical
or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to
be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of good faith, superior skill and careful
judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely
to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
65
The phrase "voluntary consent" in Point No. 1 of the Nuremberg
Code means informed consent as well. This can be determined from
the elaborate definition of voluntary consent which accompanied point
one.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-
reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject
matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an
affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known
to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and
means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which
65. Id. at 181-82.
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may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and
responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each
individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a personal
duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impumity.66
In respect to point two of the Nuremberg Code, it may be danger-
ous to suggest that an experiment which might otherwise be un-
justifiable is justified because it is for the common good. Any clinical
investigator can claim that what he is doing is for the good of
society. Certainly an increased risk must never be accepted simply
because the project is believed to be of great importance or value to
the community. More important considerations than the possible value
of a clinical investigation are:
(1) whether it is well conceived and planned,
(2) whether thought has gone into the framing of hypotheses to
be tested,
(3) whether the experiment is designed to answer the questions
posed,
(4) whether the same information could be equally well obtained
by experiments on laboratory animals, and
(5) whether the clinician has the skill and knowledge necessary
to conduct the investigation properly.
In connection with point nine of the Nuremberg Code, it is interest-
ing to note that Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, in their
Awareness of Dying, make the following observation:
A basic principle in clinical research is that a subject should be allowed to
withdraw when he feels that continuation is mentally and physically im-
possible, however, this rule is often not the operating criteria for deciding
on a withdrawal. It is easy enough to say that the patient in his distraught
condition is not mentally capable of deciding whether he is mentally and
physically capable of continuing. It must, therefore, be decided for him
by family or the doctor, and thus the patient loses this apparent control.
67
It is apparent that the Nuremberg Code has an unusual status-it
was drafted primarily for the purpose of a war crime trial, yet it was
intended to be a statement of ethical principles for clinical investiga-
tion. There is no doubt that anyone in the United States who engaged
in experiments similar to those disclosed in the Nuremberg trial would
be convicted under existing criminal laws, that is, there would be no
66. United States v. Brandt, in TmaLs, op. cit. supra note 64, at 181-82.
67. KrLAsER & STRAuss, AwAmnEss OF DrING 192 (1965).
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need to refer to the code. It should be noted, however, that in the
Nuremberg trial in no instance was the guilt of an accused based
solely upon a failure to give sufficient information to the experimental
subject in obtaining his consent.
2. Principles of Medical Ethics.-The significance attached to the
Nuremberg Code was reflected in a report of the Judicial Council
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Associa-
tion in December of 1946.68 According to this report, in order to
conform to the Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA, the following
requirements for clinical investigations on human beings must be
satisfied:
1. The voluntary consent of the person on whom the experiment
is to be performed must be obtained;
2. The danger of each experiment must have been investigated
previously by means of animal experimentation; and
3. The experiment must be performed under proper medical
protection and management.
68. The proceedings of the San Francisco, 1946, session of the House of Delegates
of the American Medical Association contain a resolution presented by Robertson Ward,
M.D., of California, directing the appropriate committee or council of AMA to re-
view, clarify, and recommend to the next session of the House such revisions in the
Principles of Medical Ethics as may be found necessary and advisable. The Judicial
Council sat as a reference committee to consider this resolution and recommended its
approval and requested that it be permitted to include its findings in its annual report
to the House at the Annual Session in 1947.
The proceedings of the Chicago, 1946, session of the House of Delegates reflect that
R. L. Sensenich, M.D., Chairman of the Board of Trustees, submitted the following
report:
"The Department of State of the federal government several months ago requestecd
the American Medical Association to suggest the name of an outstanding medical
investigator to represent the United States on an interallied commission to study the
medical experiments on human beings carried on by the Nazi government during the
war. The Board of Trustees selected Dr. A. C. Ivy of Chicago as the representative.
Dr. Ivy went to Europe and on his return submitted a report to the government and.
a copy to the Board of Trustees. The Board referred the report to the Judicial Coun-
cil, and it is expected that the Council will report to the House of Delegates its.
conclusions and recommendations."
E. R. Cunnliffe, M.D., Chairman of the Judicial Council, presented the following
report of the Council:
"This supplementary report concerns the report made by Dr. A. C. Ivy, who was.
sent to Europe as a representative of the United States Government to review the
war crimes of a medical nature committed by the Germans, which report was re-
ferred to the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees, which in turn referred
the matter to the Judicial Council.
"The Council finds that the experiments described in Dr. Ivy's report are absolutely
opposed to the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association and
are to be condemned. In order to conform to the ethics of the American Medical
Association, three requirements must be satisfied: (1) the voluntary consent of the
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3. Declaration of Helsinki.-Another set of widely recognized ethical
standards is the "Declaration of Helsinki," set forth below:
Recommendations Guiding Doctors in Clinical
Research
Introduction
It is the mission of the doctor to safeguard the health of the people. His
knowledge and conscience are dedicated to the fulfillment of this mission.
The Declaration of Geneva of The World Medical Association binds the
doctor with the words: 'The health of my patient will be my first con-
sideration' and the International Code of Medical Ethics which declares
that 'Any act or advice which could weaken physical or mental resistance
of a human being may be used only in his interest.
Because it is essential that the results of laboratory experiments be applied
to human beings to further scientific knowledge and to help suffering
humanity, The World Medical Association has prepared the following
recommendations as a guide to each doctor in clinical research. It must be
stressed that the standards as drafted are only a guide to physicians all
over the world. Doctors are not relieved from criminal, civil and ethical
responsibilities under the laws of their own countries.
In the field of clinical research a fundamental distinction must be recog-
nized between clinical research in which the aim is essentially therapeutic
for a patient, and the clinical research, the essential object of which is
purely scientific and without therapeutic value to the person subjected to
the research.
I. Basic Principles
1. Clinical research must conform to the moral and scientific principles
that justify medical research and should be based on laboratory and animal
experiments or other scientifically established facts.
2. Clinical research should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons and under the supervision of a qualified medical man.
3. Clinical research cannot legitimately be carried out unless the impor-
person on whom the experiment is to be performed; (2) the danger of each experiment
must be previously investigated by animal experimentation; and (3) the experiment
must be performed under proper medical protection and management."
This report was referred to the Reference Committee on Miscellaneous Business.
The report of the Reference Committee on Miscellaneous Business contains the
following statement:
"Your Reference Committee finds that the experiments described in Doctor Ivy's
report are opposed to the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Associ-
ation, which have three basic requirements: 1. The voluntary consent of the indi-
vidual on whom the experiment is to be performed must be obtained; 2. The danger
of each experiment must be previously investigated by animal experimentation, and
3. The experiment must be performed under proper medical protection and manage-
ment."
When this section of the Reference Committee report was presented, it was carried
after an amendment suggested by Edward P. Flood, M.D., and seconded by James C.




tance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the subject.
4. Every clinical research project should be preceded by careful assess-
ment of inherent risks in comparison to foreseeable benefits to the subject
or to others.
5. Special caution should be exercised by the doctor in performing clinical
research in which the personality of the subject is liable to be altered by
drugs or experimental procedure.
H. Clinical Research Combined With Professional Care
1. In the treatment of the sick person, the doctor must be free to use a
new therapeutic measure, if in his judgment it offers hope of saving life,
reestablishing health, or alleviating suffering.
If at all possible, consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should
obtain the patient's freely given consent after the patient has been given a
full explanation. In case of legal incapacity, counsel should also be procured
from the legal guardian; in case of physical incapacity the permission of the
legal guardian replaces that of the patient.
2. The doctor can combine clinical research with professional care, the
objective being the acquisition of new medical knowledge, only to the extent
that clinical research is justified by its therapeutic value for the patient.
III. Non-Therapeutic Clinical Research
1. In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried out on
a human being, it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the
life and health of that person on whom clinical research is being carried
out.
2. The nature, the purpose and the risk of clinical research must be
explained to the subject by the doctor.
3a. Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without his
free consent after he has been informed; if he is legally incompetent, the
consent of the legal guardian should be procured.
3b. The subject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical
and legal state as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice.
3c. Consent should, as a rule, be obtained in writing. However, the
responsibility for clinical research always remains with the research worker;
it never falls on the subject even after consent is obtained.
4a. The investigator must respect the right of each individual to safeguard
his personal integrity, especially if the subject is in a dependent relationship
to the investigator.
4b. At any time during the course of clinical research the subject or his
guardian should be free to withdraw permission for research to be continued.
The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research
if in his or their judgment, it may, if continued, be harmful to the in-
dividual.6 9
69. This declaration as a project code of ethics on human experimentation drawn
up by the World Medical Association was published in the British Medical Journal,
October 27, 1962. The original project of this was in English. A revised version was
accepted as the final project at the meeting of the World Medical Association in
Helsinki in June, 1964. The original of the project was in French.
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The "Declaration of Helsinid" was approved in 1966 by the American
Medical Association, the American Federation for- Clinical Research,
the American Society for Clinical Investigation, the Central Society
for Clinical Research, the American College of Physicians, the
American College of Surgeons, the Society for Pediatric Research, and
the American Academy of Pediatrics, with the following statement:
We, the undersigned medical organizations, endorse the ethical principles
set forth in the Declaration of Helsinki by the World Medical Association
concerning human experimentation. These principles supplement the prin-
ciples of medical ethics to which American physicians already subscribe.
4. Law Divisions Guides.-The Law Division of the American
Medical Association has also issued some guides for physicians in
connection with the use of drugs under clinical investigation. These
guides are as follows:
Generally, drugs under clinical investigation should be administered only
where: (1) the informed consent of the patient or his authorized repre-
sentative has been obtained; (2) the physician is convinced of the reasonable
accuracy of his diagnosis and, if necessary, has confirmed it by adequate
consultation; and (3) existing methods of treatment have proven unsatisfac-
tory. The voluntary participation of the patient will not excuse a deviation
from the physician's obligation to exercise his best skill in rendering the care
required of a reasonable practitioner. Furthermore, the physician is advised
to confine his clinical investigation of new drugs to those furnished by
reputable sources vho have supplied him with comprehensive written infor-
mation concerning: (1) animal experimentation; (2) previous clinical in-
vestigations, if any; (3) recommended dosages; (4) contra-indications;
(5) possible side-effects to be watched for; and (6) the safety and possible
usefulness of the drug, from existing data.7 0
The Law Division has drafted model consent forms for experimental
procedure or treatment7' and for treatment with drugs under clinical
70. AMA LAW DEPT., MEDICOLEGAL Fommus wrrm LEGAL ANALYsxs 37 n.29 (1961).
71. AMA LAw DEP., op. cit. supra note 70, at 37 (1961). Form 28 reads as follows:
A.M.
DateTime__ _P.M.
I authorize the performance upon
(myself or name of patient)
of the following procedure or treatment
(State nature of
procedure or treatment)
The nature and purpose of the procedure or treatment, possible alternative
methods of treatment, the risks- involved, and the possibility of complications
have been explained to me. I fully understand that the procedure or treatment
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investigation. 72 These forms are widely used in the medical profession.
The foregoing ethical standards provide some guidance for the
clinical investigators and for the attorneys who are called upon to
guide them. Clearly, these ethical standards are not the last word.
Questions concerning the interpretation or application of the existing
standards will surely arise. Other questions which are not specifically
answered may require the adoption of new ethical guides.
The body authorized to decide questions of medical ethics for
physicians is the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association.
Since the volume of clinical investigation is increasing and since the
ethics of such investigation is being discussed with increasing fre-
quency, the Judicial Council can be expected to issue, from time to
time, statements and rulings supplementing and clarifying the stan-
dards established by the Principles of Medical Ethics and the "De-
claration of Helsinki."
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, the law does not provide detailed specific rules concern-
ing the rights, obligations, and limitations of clinical investigation. It
is doubtful, however, whether it would ever be desirable for these rules
to be established by statute. Statutory rules lack the flexibility that is
to be performed is experimental and unproven by medical experience, and that
the consequences are unpredictable.
Signed
(Patient or person authorized to consent for patient)
Witness
72. AMA LAw DEP., op. cit. supranote 70, at 37. Form 29 reads as follows:
A.M.
Date Time P.M.
I authorize Dr. , the attending physician, to treat
_ with the drug presently identified as
(name of patient)
for the following condition:
(Describe symptoms of disease to be treated)
It has been explained to me that the safety and usefulness of the drug in
the treatment of patients for the above condition are now being investigated
and the manufacturer or distributor has supplied the drug for the purpose of
providing further evidence of its safety and usefulness.
I voluntarily consent to treatment with the drug and release the attending
physician from liability for any results that may occur.
Signed




necessary for reasonable adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances
such as exist in the field of clinical investigation. The development
and adaptation of rules on a case by case basis appears to be pref-
erable, even though this process always leaves areas of uncertainty.
At the threshold of this legal process, which is the point at which
clinical investigation stands today, many specific legal questions are
undecided. But a practical guide for conduct is afforded by the general
rules of law and the ethical standards which have been developed.
The conscientious clinical investigator in these circumstances can carry
on with the kinds of investigation which are essential for the advance-
ment of medical science and at the same time protect the rights and
interests of his patients and subjects.
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